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LIGHTS, CAMERA... TICKET: RED LIGHT CAMERAS AFTER
IDRIS V. CITY OF CHICAGO

Cooper J. Strickland'
Red light camera technology is in use in many jurisdictions
throughout the United States.
For some, this technology
represents a powerful tool for improving road safety. For others,
its use represents overreachingby governments searchingfor ways
to generate additional revenue. In Idris v. City of Chicago, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined the constitutionality of
Chicago's red light camera ordinance and held, in part, that the
ordinance did not violate the substantive due process or equal
protection clauses of the FourteenthAmendment. Goingforward,
the Idris decision will likely limit the effectiveness of Fourteenth
Amendment challenges pursuedby red light camera opponents.
I. INTRODUCTION

The use of red light camera technology is widespread: the
Federal Highway Administration identifies twenty-one states that
"have considered camera technology for [law] enforcement and
have either passed legislation or are considering legislation to
enforce red light running with camera technology." 2 The City of
1J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.

2 U.S.

Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration Safety,
RLR Cameras Overview, http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersections/rlrcam
overview.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). Generally, red light camera systems rely on
sensors located beneath the intersection pavement to trigger the camera system.
See, e.g., City of Chicago Official Homepage, Red-Light Camera Enforcement Program Overview, http://egov.cityofchicago.org (follow "City Departments"
hyperlink; then follow "Office of Emergency Management and Communication"
hyperlink; then follow "Red-Light Camera Enforcement" hyperlink under
"Traffic Management Authority"; then follow "Program Overview" hyperlink)
(last visited Feb. 14, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). Once the light has turned red, the system is ready to be triggered.
Id. Photographic and video footage is taken if a vehicle travels over the sensors
119
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Chicago has "one of the largest red light camera programs in the
U.S.," 3 incorporating 248 cameras at 123 intersections. 4 Since the
program began in November 2003, fines totaling $109 million
have been collected.5 In 2008 alone, 579,560 citations were
issued, totaling $44.8 million in fines. 6 These statistics reveal the
scope of Chicago's program and its effect on the public's pocket
book.
above a minimum speed. Id. The vendor reviews the image and forwards it to
the City for final review and processing. Id. A citation is then issued to the
vehicle's registered owner. Id. See generally Daryl J. Jones, PatrollingTraffic
by Camera, 45 REv. DER. P.R. 197, 199 (2006) (describing vehicle detector
technology).
3 Redflex Traffic Systems, Redlight Enforcement, http://www.redflex
.com/html/usa/results redlight.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). While not the only vendor of
red light camera technology, Chicago's vendor, Redflex Traffic Systems, "has
contracts with more than 230 U.S. cities, and is the largest provider of digital red
light and speed enforcement services in North America."
Press Release,
Redfilex Holdings Limited, Redfilex Expands Across California with Two New
Red Light Enforcement Contracts (Mar. 10, 2009), available at http://
redflex.com/publicdocuments/asx announcements/2009-03-10%20Huntington
%20Beach%20and%2OSan%20Rafael%20CA.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2009)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
4 Fran Spielman, Appeals Court Ruling Paves Way for More Red-Light
Cameras, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.suntimes.com/news/
politics/1362558,chicago-red-light-cameres-court-of-appeals-0 10509.article
(last visited Jan. 24, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
s Jon Hilkevitch, When CTA Driver Runs Light, You Pay, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 26,
2009, § 1, at 1. Currently, a red light camera fine is one hundred dollars. See
CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE §9-100-020(d) (2008). Red light cameras are big
business in Chicago with a substantial amount of the program's revenue going to
the vendor; for example, on March 3, 2008, the Chicago Office of Emergency
Management and Communications announced a five-year, $52 million contract
with Redflex.
Press Release, Office of Emergency Management and
Communications, Chicago Awards Red Light Camera Contract (Mar. 3, 2008),
available at http://egov.cityofchicago.org (follow "City Departments" hyperlink;
then follow "Office of Emergency Management and Communications"
hyperlink; then follow "2008" hyperlink under "Archived Press Releases"; then
follow "Chicago Awards Red Light Camera Contract" hyperlink) (last visited
Feb. 14, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
6 Hilkevitch, supra note 5.
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In Idris v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that it was rational for the City of Chicago to fine the
owner of the vehicle, as opposed to the vehicle driver, for a
violation of the City's red light camera ordinance.8 Specifically,
the Idris court rejected the ordinance challengers' argument that
the "vicarious liability" component of the ordinance violates the
equal protection and due process clauses of the U.S. Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The Idris court's analysis will likely
have a negative impact on future Fourteenth Amendment
challenges of red light camera technology and owner liability
presumptions.
Part II of this Recent Development examines the City of
Chicago's red light camera ordinance as it relates to the facts of
Idris. Part III analyzes the court's application of the rational basis
test and the tenuous connection between the means and ends of the
City's ordinance within the innocent owner context. Part IV
examines the remaining options available to red light camera

opponents in light of Idris. This Recent Development concludes
by examining the impact this decision will have on the use of this
technology and on future litigants who wish to challenge it under
the U.S. Constitution.

552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 566.
9Id. at 565-67. In application, this is similar to a denial of the innocent owner
defense, see, e.g., Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6085, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3933, at *18, *21 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008), aff'd, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir.
2009), or a presumption that the registered owner committed the violation, see
generally FED. HIGH. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PUBL'N No. FHWA-SA05-002, RED LIGHT CAMERA SYSTEMS OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES 14 (2005),
available at http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersections/rlc guide/rlcguide05jan.pdf
(last visited Feb. 14, 2009) (comparing the two approaches taken by statesdriver responsibility or registered owner responsibility) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
8See
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II. CHICAGO's RED LIGHT CAMERA ORDINANCE

Given that federal courts have largely "avoided deciding the
constitutionality" of red light camera programs,10 Idris may serve
as a benchmark for how federal courts deal with Fourteenth
Amendment issues created by this technology.' At a minimum,
Idris suggests that any future Fourteenth Amendment challenge of
Chicago's red light camera program will likely be unsuccessful.
In 2003, the City of Chicago instituted a red light camera
program. 12 The pertinent components of the red light ordinance at
issue in Idris include: (1) the creation of a civil, non-criminal,
penalty; 13 (2) a presumption that the registered owner of the

10 See Kevin P. Shannon, Speeding Towards Disaster: How Cleveland's
Traffic Cameras Violate the Ohio Constitution, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 616
(2007). See generally Hoekstra v. City of Arnold, Mo., No. 4:08CV0267 TCM,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7465, at *49 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 2009) ("[D]eny[ing] the
motions to dismiss to the extent they challenge the constitutionality of the
Ordinance, subject to further presentation of the parties' positions on the

constitutionality of the Ordinance . . . .") (citations omitted); Shavitz v. Guilford

County Bd. of Educ., 100 F. App'x. 146, 152 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated 270 F.
Supp. 2d 702 (M.D.N.C. 2003) ("[Vacating because] the claims are not part of
the same Article III case or controversy, and the district court erred by
exercising supplemental jurisdiction . .
).
11As precedent, Idris will be most applicable to federal litigation with
analogous Fourteenth Amendment claims. See generally Idris, 552 F.3d at 565
(analyzing claims regarding the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution).
12 Hilkevitch, supra note 5. The program is authorized under Chapter 9-102
of the Chicago Traffic Code.

See CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE

§ 9-102

(2008). The system must use "photographic means" to capture the registration
plate of the violating vehicle. CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE § 9-102-010(b)
(2008). Eight Illinois counties and their respective municipalities are granted
authority under state law to implement automated law enforcement systems at
red light intersections. See generally 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-208.6

(West 2008) (outlining the method by which "the counties of Cook, DuPage,
Kane, Lake, Madison, McHenry, St. Clair, and Will and . . . municipalities

within those counties" may institute automated traffic law enforcement
systems).
" See CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE

ANN. 5/11-208.6 (West 2008).

§ 9-102 (2008); 625

ILL. COMP. STAT.
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vehicle is liable for a violation; 14 (3) the use of photographic
images of the vehicle as "prima facie evidence of a violation;"' 5
and (4) the limited and narrow applicability of available defenses.16
Each of these components directly contributed to the conflict at
issue in Idris.17
The distinguishing characteristic of the Idris litigation is the
ordinance challengers' ("appellants") assertion that they were not
driving at the time of the violation.18 In fact, one of the three
named appellants was out of the country at the time of the alleged
violation. 19 Another argued that he received a ticket for a time

14 See CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE § 9-102-020(a) (2008). Exceptions exist
if the operator was given a "uniform traffic citation for a violation of Section 98-020(c) or Section 9-16-030(c)," e.g., an officer issued a duplicate ticket, see
CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE § 9-102-020(a)(1) (2008), the vehicle or
registration plates are reported stolen, see CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE §9-

102-020(a)(2) (2008), or the vehicle was a leased vehicle, see CHI., ILL., CHI.
TRAFFIC CODE § 9-102-020(a)(3) (2008). "[T]he term 'leased vehicle' . . . [is]

defined as a vehicle in which a motor vehicle dealership or manufacturer has,
pursuant to a written document, vested exclusive possession, use, control and
responsibility of the vehicle to the lessee during the periods the vehicle is
operated by or for the lessee." Id.
1 CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE § 9-102-020(a) (2008).
16 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. A liability exception
also exists
if the vehicle was yielding right-of-way for an authorized emergency vehicle or
was part of a lawful funeral procession. See CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE § 9102-020(b) (2008). Other grounds for defense are presumably available if the

owner provides a basis for an administrative hearing.

See CHI., ILL., CHI.

TRAFFIC CODE § 9-102-040 (2008).
1 See discussion infra Part Ill. First, Chicago's civil penalty does not affect a

fundamental right; therefore, the "owner presumption" is analyzed under the
rational basis standard. See id. Second, the elimination of an innocent owner
defense merely creates an over-inclusive classification under an equal protection
analysis. See id.
18 Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6085, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008), aff'd, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009). However, the
appellants do not dispute that they are the registered owners of the cited
vehicles. Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Idris
v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1363) [hereinafter

Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants].
19

Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 18, at 6.
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when his vehicle was not in use. 20 The third appellant simply paid
the fine. 2 1 For the Idris challengers, the fact that the ordinance did
not take into consideration whether they actually committed the
violation supported their position that the ordinance was
-22
unconstitutional.
The appellants' constitutional claims focused, in part,23 on
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Appellants claimed
that the fine deprived them of their property without due process,
resulting in a substantive due process violation,2 5 because the
ordinance made it "irrelevant whether the penalized party [i.e., the
owner of a car] actually violated a red traffic-signal."2 6 Appellants
Id. Appellees' brief states that the vehicle was not in use by "'an authorized
agent"' or its .'sole owner."' Brief of the City of Chicago, Chicago Office of
Emergency Management and Communications, Chicago Department of
Revenue, Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings, and Mayor Richard
M. Daley at 11, Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009) (No. 081363) [hereinafter Brief of Defendants-Appel lees].
21 Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra
note 20, at 12.
22 See Idris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at * 19 20 ("[The Idris
challengers]
argue that Chapter 9-102 suffers from 'overbreadth,'
and that it
unconstitutionally places liability on a vehicle's owner, even when the owner
was not driving at the time of a red light violation.").
23 See Idris, 552 F.3d at 567 (claiming procedural due process
violations).
24 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 18, at 8. The case originated
in a state court, but was removed to federal court by the City of Chicago. See
Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 20, at 2. The federal district court
20

granted summary judgment thereby dismissing the appellants' federal and state-

law claims. See id.
25 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 18, at 6 (describing Count II
of the ordinance challengers' Amended Complaint alleging a violation of
substantive due process).
26
ldris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at *17-18 (quoting an allegation from
the ordinance challengers' complaint). Without an "innocent owner" exception
to the ordinance, the most practical defense is to show that the violation did not
occur at all. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 20, at 30-34. But
see Automated Traffic Law Enforcement Model Law § 7(b) (1997), available at
http://www.ncutlo.org/autoenforce622.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009) ("The
court may consider in defense of a violation .

.

. [e]vidence satisfactory to the

Court that the person named in the citation was not operating the vehicle at the
time of the violation .

Technology).

.. .")

(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
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also claimed that an equal protection violation resulted from the
inconsistent treatment of various vehicle ownership groups; 27
specifically, owners that produce valid leases are not subject to
liability. 28 The Idris court's treatment of these claims could have
implications beyond the Seventh Circuit, because other
jurisdictions also provide exceptions for lessors 29 and consider it
irrelevant whether the penalized party actually committed the
violation. 30
III. CHICAGO'S RED LIGHT CAMERA PROGRAM AND THE
RATIONAL BASIS TEST

The substantive due process and equal protection claims in
Idris were subject to a difficult, if not impossible, obstacle. 3'
See Idris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at *6. Plaintiff further argues that
the violation itself is treated differently under state law, id., because under
Illinois state law, running a red light is subject to criminal sanctions, id. at *14.
The district court dismissed this argument due to the fact that similarly situated
people are not being treated differently under the law-code or statute-that is
being applied to the respective groups. Id. Rather, there are merely multiple
punishments for the same conduct. Id.
28 See id. at *6; see also CHLO, ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE § 9-102-020(a)(3)
(2008).
27

29

See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.

3o See

TEX.

TRANSP.

707.013(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008).

CODE ANN.§

707.013(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008);
CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE § 413.031(b)(1) (2008).
Cleveland's
ordinance is unique in that it allows the owner to submit a defense, via affidavit,
that another was driving, but this does not shift liability away from the owner if
the identified driver denies the owner's claim. See CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC
CODE § 413.031(k)(4) (2008). But see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-968.1(D)
(2008) (creating an owner liability presumption that may be rebutted if the
owner files an affidavit or testifies in open court that "he was not the operator of
the vehicle at the time of the alleged violation").
3 "[L]aws generally are declared unconstitutional when ... [strict scrutiny] is
applied."
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 6.5, at 542 (3rd ed. 2006). Only a few laws have been invalidated by
means of the rational basis test. See id. § 6.5, at 540 (citing Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)). Appellants also made a procedural due
process claim that failed. Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 567 (7th Cir.
2009). Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this work.
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Specifically, a strict scrutiny analysis of the ordinance is
unavailable because neither a fundamental liberty interest nor a
suspect class exists within the Idris context.32 A fundamental
liberty interest is lacking because the property interest at issue, a
ninety-dollar civil penalty, is too modest. 33 An equal protection
violation is not present, given that the parties do not even attempt
to argue that a suspect class exists. 34 Consequently, both the
substantive due process and equal protection claims are subject to
rational basis review.3 5
Under the rational basis test "a law will be upheld if it is
rationally relatedto a legitimate government purpose."36 Thus, as
applied in Idris, the red light camera ordinance must have an
objective that is legitimate for the City of Chicago to pursue. 3 7 if
legitimate, Chicago's objective is not required to be "compelling or
important."3 8 Furthermore, the means used by Chicago to fulfill its

See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text; see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 31, § 6.5, at 541-42; Thomas M. Stanek, Photo Radar in Arizona: Is
It Constitutional?,30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1209, 1235, 1238-39 (1998). Intermediate
scrutiny is also unavailable because the ordinance does not involve "gender
discrimination, discrimination against non-martial children, discrimination
against undocumented alien children with regard to education, and regulation of
commercial speech and of speech in public forums." CHEMERINSKY, supra note
31, § 6.5, at 541 (footnotes omitted).
32

3 Idris, 552 F.3d at 566.

Furthermore, two of the named appellants are

corporations; they "have no fundamental rights."
Brief of DefendantsAppellees, supra note 20, at 20 (citing Nat'1 Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of
Chi., 45 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1995)).
34 See Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6085, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933,
at *10-11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008), aff'd, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009).
35 See Idris, 552 F.3d at 566-67. "All laws challenged under the due process
clause or equal protection must meet at least rational basis review."
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 6.5, at 540.
36 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 6.5, at 540 (citing Pennell v. City of San

Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Allied
Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952)).
37 See id.
38
1Id. §9.1, at 672.

10 N.C. JOLT ONLINE ED. 96, 127

Lights, Camera ... Ticket
objective need only be reasonable or rational in light of the
objective.3 9
The burden is on the ordinance challengers to (1) show that
there are no conceivable legitimate purposes or (2) prove that the
means are so arbitrary as to be an unreasonable or irrational
method for attaining the City's objective. 40 This is an extremely
difficult burden for the appellants because rational basis review
"employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's
awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is
peculiarly a legislative task." 4 1 Consequently, the rational basis
test allows potentially "[u]nfair laws . . . to stand because a
conceivable legitimate purpose can be identified for virtually any
law." 42
As the district court states in Idris, "[tihe rational basis test
under substantive due process is identical to the rational basis test
under equal protection."43 For that reason, the first step in
analyzing Idris is to identify a conceivably legitimate purpose for
the City's ordinance.44 Chicago argues that it has a legitimate
interest in "enforcing its traffic regulations." 45 By extension, this
interest reasonably includes public safety and efficient law
enforcement components. 46
39

See id. § 6.5, at 540, § 9.1, at 672.

40

See id. § 6.5, at 540.
Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (analyzing

41

classification under equal protection); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, §
6.5, at 540.
42 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, § 9.2, at 679; see also Lindsley v. Natural

Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend . . . [the equal protection] clause merely

because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results
in some inequality.").
43 Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6085, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at
*19 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008), aff'd, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009).
44 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
45 Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 20, at 15.
46 See generally Jonathan Miller, With Cameras on the Corner, Your Ticket is
in the Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at GI (describing the safety arguments

associated with this technology); Stanek, supra note 32, at 1210 ("[C]ities are
'flocking to photo radar' to facilitate the traffic enforcement goals of lowering
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Given that running a red light is relatively dangerous, 47
Chicago's interest in public safety will ensure survival under
rational basis review regardless of whether the innocent vehicle
owner or violating driver challenges the relationship between the
City's purpose and the red light camera ordinance.48 Avoiding
consideration of any underlying safety justification,4 9 the Idris
court found that photographic evidence of the violation and the
presumption of owner liability are rational because it reduces the
costs of law enforcement, 5o increases violation detection,5 1 and
speeds and reducing accidents.") (footnote omitted); Mary Lehman, Are Red
Light Cameras Snapping Privacy Rights?, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 815, 829 (2002)
("Red light cameras . . . provid[e] twenty-four hour surveillance of traffic
intersections, 'thereby freeing officers to focus on other enforcement needs."')
(footnote omitted).
47 For example, a Federal Highway Administration report states that drivers
running red lights "is estimated to produce more than 100,000 crashes and
approximately 1,000 deaths per year in the United States." FED. HIGH. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PUBL'N No. FHWA-HRT-05-049, SAFETY EVALUATION
OF RED-LIGHT CAMERAS-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2005) (footnote omitted),

available at http://www.tfhrc.gov/safety/pubs/05049/05049.pdf (last visited Feb.
24, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
48 One must assume that use of red light technology is rationally related to
safety improvements. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See generally
Stanek, supra note 32, at 1235 ("[U]nder the rational basis standard of review,
photo radar is clearly reasonably related to a municipality's interest in public
safety.").
49 Chicago and the challengers brought up the issue of safety in their
respective briefs. See Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 20, at 15, 22;
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 18, at 19 20, 24. The Idris court
performed a narrow analysis of this issue in not examining the safety
justification, see infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text; however, this
approach was likely warranted given that the challengers' claims were primarily
rooted in the owner liability presumption, see Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d
564, 565-67 (7th Cir. 2009).
50
dris, 552 F.3d at 566. This may be viewed as a component of the efficient
law enforcement purpose. See id. For the sake of this work, it will be assumed
that this benefit is debatable and potentially incorrect in practice. In part, this is
because effective methods exist to escape red light camera detection. See
Miller, supra note 46 ("Some drivers have escalated the technological arms race
by using simple sprays and shields that they believe obscure the license plates
when photographed."). Therefore, for the ordinance to serve its purpose, law
enforcement resources will need to be directed towards policing for those
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prevents owners from easily escaping liability.52 The court also
found that the distinction between lessors and owners is rational
because owners can identify the violating driver and exercise
control over that individual.
Nevertheless, the rationales identified by the Idris court are
seemingly peripheral considering that safety is the widely
advertized basis for public support of red light camera programs.54
Unfortunately, the rationality of holding an innocent owner liable
becomes tenuous within the safety context, because the non-owner
drivers who create the safety risk are only indirectly affected by
the direct punishment of the vehicle's registered owner.5 5 In
effect, this approach creates thousands of non-owner violators,
which the system merely assumes will be deterred from running
red lights by the owner. 56
devices. Id. ("[M]any states, like Maryland, now specifically outlaw the use of
them.").
"i Idris, 552 F.3d at 566.
52 id.
5 See generally id. at 567 ("The City's goal is to impose the fine on the
person who according to readily available legal documents is in charge of the
car, and therefore either responsible for the violation or able to determine
whether the car is driven by law-abiding persons.").
54 See generally City of Chicago Official Homepage, Chicago Red-Light
Cameras, http://egov.cityofchicago.org (follow "City Departments" hyperlink;
then follow "Office of Emergency Management and Communication" hyperlink;
then follow "Red-Light

Camera

Enforcement"

hyperlink under "Traffic

Management Authority"; then follow "Chicago Red-Light Cameras" hyperlink)
(last visited Feb. 14, 2009) ("[Chicago] is using red-light camera enforcement to
make Chicago intersections safer.") (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
5 See generally City of Chicago Official Homepage, supra note 2 ("In cities
that have red-light cameras, 90 percent of the time, the registered owner of the
vehicle was behind the wheel when the violation occurred."). In Chicago, this
means that in 2008 approximately 57,956 violations were due to non-owner
driver activity. See generally id. (indicating that ten percent of violators are not
the owners); Hilkevitch, supra note 5 (identifying 579,560 violations in 2008).
56 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. The Idris court assumes that "an
owner can insist that the driver reimburse the outlay if he wants to use the car
again (or maintain the friendship)" or "take more care when lending their car[],
and ... pass the expense on to the real wrongdoer." Idris, 552 F.3d at 566.
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Given that public support relies heavily on a safety
justification,5 7 a meaningful assessment of Chicago's ordinance
should require an evaluation of whether the use of this technology
is an arbitrary and unreasonable method for improving safety.5 8
Using red light cameras as a means to improve safety requires
consideration of at least three possible criticisms. 59 First, red light
cameras are frequently shown to increase the risks associated with
intersections. 60
Specifically, red light camera intersections
allegedly increase rates of rear end accidents, presumably because

5 See generally City of Chicago Official Homepage, supra note 2 ("First and
foremost, this program is about safety-safety of motorists, pedestrians,
bicyclists, and anyone in or near an intersection.").
58

See supra

notes 40, 54 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 60, 63-66 and accompanying text.
60
See, e.g., Red Light Camera Studies Roundup, THENEWSPAPER.COM, May
31, 2005, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/04/430.asp (last visited Feb. 24,
2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
"Comprehensive studies conclude cameras actually increase crashes and
59

injuries, providing a safety argument not to install them .

. .

. [P]ublic policy

should avoid conflicts of interest that enhance revenues for government and
private interests at the risk of public safety." Id. (quoting a 2008 University of
South Florida report). The studies found that:
The cameras were associated with an increase in total crashes[.] ...
The aggregate EB results suggested that this increase was 29%[.] . . .
The cameras were associated with an increase in the frequency of
injury crashes[.] . . . The aggregate EB results suggested an 18%

increase, although the point estimates for individual jurisdictions were
substantially higher (59%, 79%, or 89% increases) or lower (6%
increase or a 5% decrease.

Id. (quoting Barbara Langlard-Orban, et al., Red Light Running Cameras:
Would Crashes, Injuries and Automobile Insurance Rates Increase if They are
Used in Florida?, FLORIDA PUB. HEALTH REv. (2008)).

"The cameras are

correlated with an increase in total crashes of 8 % to 17%." Id. (quoting a 2005
Virginia Department of Transportation study). "Our findings are more
pessimistic, finding no change in angle accidents and large increases in rear-end
crashes and many other types of crashes relative to other intersections." Id.
(quoting a 2004 North Carolina A&T State University study). But see FED.
HIGH. ADMIN., supra note 47 ("Crash effects detected were consistent in
direction with those found in many previous studies: decreased right-angle
crashes and increased rear end ones.").
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drivers attempt to stop suddenly in reaction to a signal change;61
whereas, the technology is intended to reduce those accidents in
which a red light runner is hit in the side by another vehicle
traveling perpendicular to the red light violator. 62 Second, the
technology has been shown to be the object of manipulation:
distortion of safety improvements, 6 3 shortening of traffic signals, 64
and selection of intersections for fine-generating potential rather
than positive safety effects. 65 Finally, the ordinance itself fails to

6i See generally FED. HIGH. ADMIN., supranote 47; Lehman, supra note 46, at
832 ("[C]ameras are causing more accidents from 'panic stops'.... .").
62 See generally City of Chicago Official Homepage, supra note 54
(describing Chicago's search for "locations with the highest incidence of socalled 'right-angle' crashes-those consistent with a driver running a red light").
63 See, e.g., Houston ManipulatedStudy to Make Red Light CamerasAppear
Safer, THENEWSPAPER.COM,
Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.thenewspaper
.com/news/26/2675.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). "Houston police began to push
[Professor Robert M.] Stein to weaken his design [for a study of Houston's red
light camera program] to match techniques used in studies conducted by
insurance industry researchers and others with an interest in promoting the use
of photo enforcement." Id. "Houston Mayor Bill White had selected Urban
Politics Professor Robert Stein [at Rice University] to create a report on the
engineering safety performance of the first fifty automated ticketing machines

installed . . . ." Id. According to a lawsuit associated with this matter, Professor

Stein was urged to alter the negative data compiled from the study. See id.
64 See, e.g., Tennessee: Refunds for Photo Tickets on Short Yellow,
THENEWSPAPER.COM,

Mar.

13,

2008, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/

22/2269.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (describing a Chattanooga, Tennessee red
light camera intersection with an "illegally short yellow time") (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology); Jacqui Cheng, Italian Red-Light
Cameras Rigged with Shorter Yellow Lights, ARS TECHINA, Feb. 2, 2009,
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/02/italian-red-light-camerasrigged-with-shorter-yellow-lights.ars (last visited Feb. 25, 2009) ("A
programmer and 108 other individuals are being investigated for rigging a
'smart' traffic light system to purposefully trap drivers [with quicker yellow to
red signals] and fine them for violations, with some speculating that up to a
million Italian drivers have been unfairly slapped with fines.") (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 46 ("[A] former employee testified that
Lockheed Martin IMS, which operated the San Diego system regularly scouted
intersections . . . based on high traffic volume, not locations that were most
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create a mechanism to remove dangerous drivers from the road.66
Theoretically, dangerous drivers who pay their fines 67 can
accumulate an infinite number of civil citations without losing
their driving privileges, 68 which in turn weakens the program's
safety justification. 69

These criticisms represent a sampling of those made against
red light camera technology. 70 Yet, under the rational basis test,
these criticisms will not likely provide an adequate foundation for
a successful challenge; at a minimum, they will have little impact
in the Seventh Circuit as a result of Idris." As Idris demonstrates,
a successful constitutional challenge in federal court will be
unlikely because claims that are subject to rational basis review are
rarely successful.72 Furthermore, a successful challenge will be
accident-prone . . . [identifying] locations with steep gradients and short yellowlight times.").
66 See generally CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE §9-102
(2008) (providing no

meaningful mechanism to negatively impact the owner or driver's license or
insurance status).
CHI., ILL., CHI. TRAFFIC CODE §9-102-060(b) (2008) ("Failure of the ...
[owner] to pay such fine or penalty within 21 days of the date of the notice may
result in the immobilization of the person's vehicle .... ).
See generally id. § 9-102 (providing no meaningful mechanism to remove
violators from the road for being a dangerous driver).
69 See generally Shannon, supra note 10, at 631 ("Civil enforcement of
speeding or red-light offense by means of a camera system does little to make
the roads safer, because it does not take violators off the road." (footnote
omitted)).

Seemingly, this ordinance could make the Chicago's roads more

dangerous if human law enforcement is reduced at intersections and drivers
become indifferent to the fine.
70 See, e.g., Jon Nielsen, Red-light Camera Rules Questioned, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 3, 2009, at 3B, available at NewsBank, Record No.
1181210582 ("These tickets are not safety-related.

. . . They're revenue-

related."); Hilkevitch, supra note 5 (describing the increase in public
transportation costs when bus drivers receive violations); Karen Ann Cullotta,
Chicago Links Street Cameras to its 911 Network, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at
A9 (describing the use of cameras for surveillance of the Chicago's streets);
Miller, supra note 46 ("[Mark Kleinschmidt, a city councilman in Chapel Hill,
N.C.] 'disapprove[s] of the privatization of a police function . . . .').
7i See generally Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009)
(holding that the ordinance survived rational basis review).
72 See supranote 31 and accompanying
text.
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unlikely because defining a legitimate government purpose in this
context is rather straightforward, given that the search reasonably
leads to public safety.73
Nonetheless, the Idris challengers, and other red light camera
opponents, 74 seek to concentrate on revenue generation as the
exclusive government purpose behind red light camera
technology.7 5 If revenue generation were the only conceivable
interest, then using red light cameras to fulfill that objective would
not survive rational basis review because the means bear no
relation to the purpose. 76 However, without a change in factual
circumstances surrounding the use of this technology, opponents
will have no success in limiting the purpose to revenue generation
for rational basis review.77
Finally, uncertainties regarding the rational connection
between red light cameras and public safety are simply
inconclusive.78 In other words, there is insufficient evidence to
show that the means are purely arbitrary; 79 therefore, a court will
defer to the legislative body's judgment.80 As the district court in
Idris correctly states, "rational basis review 'is not a license for
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices." 81
73 See generally Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6085, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3933, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008), aff'd, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009)
(describing the City's justification as "promoting traffic safety").
74 See, e.g., Nielsen, supra note 70.
75 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 18, at 24 25.
76 See generally Andrew W.J. Tarr, Picture It: Red Light Cameras Abide by
the Law of the Land, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1879, 1884 (2002) ("[T]he use of red light
cameras bears no rational relation to ... [generation of revenue as] a purpose.").
7 See discussion supranotes 39-40 and accompanying text.
71 See discussion supranote 60 and accompanying text.
79 See discussion supranotes 39-40 and accompanying text.
80 See discussion supra note 41 and accompanying text; see infra note 81 and
accompanying text.
8 Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6085, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3933, at
*12-13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2008), aff'd, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1992)); see also Tarr, supra note 76, at 1888
("Whether these red light cameras are actually promoting compliance and
safety-and they seem to be-is not for the court to decide. The legislature
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In the end, even if the means implemented by Chicago unfairly
subject the Idris challengers to liability, relative to other groups, it
is only an indication that the ordinance is overinclusive.8 2
Specifically, they were not provided an exception under the
ordinance similar to that provided for lessors; 83 however, it is
acceptable for laws to contain imperfections, including
overinclusion, under rational basis review. 84
IV. REMAINING OPTIONS FOR RED LIGHT CAMERA OPPONENTS

Opponents of red light camera programs are left with fewer
options in challenging the spread of this technology after Idris.8 5
One avenue is to educate the public about the flaws of red light
camera enforcement, particularly the safety component. 86 For a
system that is inherently vulnerable to public misgivings,8 7 this
could be the most effective form of attack. However, an
underlying concern remains that if accurate information regarding
the validity of the safety justification is unavailable, or even

must determine the means for achieving its goals. The court must only find a
rational relation between the means and purpose of the statute." (footnote
omitted)).
82 See Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 567 (7th
Cir. 2009).
83 See
84

id.
See CHEMERINSKY, supranote 3 1,

§ 9.2, at 686.

See generally Tarr, supra note 76, at 1895 ("Courts rendering judgment on
the constitutionality of red light cameras will need to address whether the
cameras are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy ... and whether the red light
camera system is an unconstitutional hidden tax.") (footnotes omitted).
16 See discussion supranotes 60, 63-66 and accompanying text.
1 See generally Michael W. Hoskins, State Puts Brakes on Red-Light
Cameras, THE IND. LAWYER, Sept. 3, 2008, at 3, available at LEXIS, Ind. News
Sources ("'That this is a source of revenue stirs up citizen emotions because it's
seen as just one more way to squeeze money from people,' . . . [Dearborn
Superior Judge G. Michael Witte stated]."); Shannon, supra note 10, at 636
("[A]ny time a municipality in the United States has been asked to vote on the
use of camera enforcement, the bill has been defeated.").
85
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suppressed,88 then government entities might effectively use red
light camera programs solely to generate revenue. 89
Another avenue is to challenge red light camera programs
under state law. 90 In several states, this has been a successful
option.91 For example, in North Carolina the use of red light
camera technology has been significantly reduced as a result of the
decision in Shavitz v. City of High Point,92 a North Carolina Court
of Appeals ruling. 93 Specifically, the court found that Article IX,
Section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution "applies to the civil
penalties assessed by .

..

camera ordinance [s]." 94

[local governments] under . . . red light

Article IX, Section 7(a) of the North

Carolina Constitution states that "'the clear proceeds of all
penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several
counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State, shall belong
to and remain in the several counties, and shall be faithfully

" See Houston Manipulated Study to Make Red Light Cameras Appear Safer,

supra note 63.
89
90

See, e.g., Nielsen, supra note 70.
See, e.g., Shannon, supra note 10, at 617; see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.

714, 719 (1975) ("[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on police activity than those ... [the U.S. Supreme] Court holds to
be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.") (citations omitted).
91See Shannon, supra note 10, at 617; see also North Carolina Supreme
Court Eliminates Profitfor Red Light Cameras, THENEWSPAPER.COM, June 30,

2007, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/ 18/1834.asp (last visited Feb. 25,
2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). "[T]he
Minnesota Supreme Court ... struck down red light cameras as a violation of
state law .

.

. and the California Supreme Court[] .

.

. [refused] to review a[n]

appellate ruling that found a city operated its red light camera program in
violation of state law." North Carolina Supreme Court Eliminates Profit for
Red Light Cameras, supra; see also Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 567

(7th Cir. 2009) (citing Minnesota v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577 (2007)).
92 630 S.E.2d 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 648 S.E.2d 845 (2007).
93

See generally North Carolina Supreme Court Eliminates Profit for Red

Light Cameras, supra note 91 (listing five major North Carolina cities that have
ended that red light camera programs since the ruling).
94 Shavitz v. City of High Point, 630 S.E.2d 4, 15 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), cert.
denied, 648 S.E.2d 845 (2007).
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appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining free public

schools."'

95

The effect of the North Carolina ruling is that ninety percent of
fine revenues must be handed over to a public school system. 96
For a city like High Point, North Carolina, which had a fifty-dollar
fine-of which thirty-five dollars went to the vendor-the ruling
creates a thirty dollar deficit after a forty-five dollar payment to a
public school system. 97 In response to this bleak financial outlook,
"Charlotte, Fayetteville, Greensboro, Greenville and High Point
have shut down ticketing operations." 98
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE IDRIS DECISION

In applying the rational basis test, the Idris court reached the
correct result. 99 Given that little precedent exists in this area,100 the
Idris decision will likely have a considerable impact on the use of
this technology. For proponents of red light cameras, Idris may be
invaluable in discouraging substantive due process and equal
protection litigation that seeks to challenge the use of this
technology. Consequently, a long-term effect of this decision may
be that Fourteenth Amendment claims will be less effective for
Id. at 7 (quoting N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 7(a)).
See id. at 16. "In exercise of this authority, the Legislature has enacted
section 115C-437 of the General Statutes: 'The clear proceeds of all penalties
and forfeitures and of all fines collected for any breach of the penal laws of the
State, as referred to in Article IX, Sec[tion] 7 of the Constitution, shall include
the full amount of all penalties, forfeitures or fines collected under authority
conferred by the State, diminished only by the actual costs of collection, not to
exceed ten percent (10%) of the amount collected."' Id. (quoting N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 115C-437 (2005)).
97 See North Carolina Appeals Court Rules Against Red Light Cameras,
THENEWSPAPER.COM, May 16, 2006, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/
11/1 132.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
98 North CarolinaSupreme Court Eliminates Profit for Red Light Cameras,
supra note 91. The ruling also means that "High Point must now pay Guilford
County Schools $1,453,703 while Charlotte owes about $4.6 million to
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools." Id.
99 See supra Part Ill.
100See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
9

96
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challengers of this technology 0 1 and any underlying presumption
of owner liability.' 0 2 At a minimum, the City of Chicago will be
less hesitant in going forward with its plan to increase the scope of
its own red light camera program.'o3

101Additionally, red light camera technology that is capable of capturing the
identity of the driver will likely become less desirable given that the Idris
decision validates a system that is not required to capture an image of the driver.
See generally Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2009) ("A
camera can show reliably which cars and trucks go through red lights but it is
less likely to show who was driving."). Considering that Idris validates a
system that embraces a presumption of owner liability, the burden of a
rebuttable presumption may be a less attractive approach. See supra notes 14,
30 and accompanying text.
102 See generally Idris, 552 F.3d at 566 (finding the presumption valid).
Paradoxically, the opinion states that the City could have asserted an affirmative
defense that would have taken away the court's ability to hear this case;
however, they did not challenge the appellants' reservation of federal issues for
federal court. See id. at 565. Is it possible that the City, and likely the vendor,
desired a precedent which confirmed the validity of their program? Without the
burden of driver identification, this precedent may benefit vendors of this
technology the most by allowing them to market this technology as a legally
viable option. See generally Heather Lynch, Success Spells Loss of City
Business For Red-Light Camera Manufacturer, THE DAILY RECORD, Dec. 11,
1999, at 5, available at LEXIS, Md. News Sources ("[A]s more of the cameras
are installed . . . the number of drivers running red lights will decrease,

rendering the cameras-and the subsequent new installations pointless.
Lockheed Martin IMS, based in New Jersey, is OK with that. The 15-year-old
company long ago developed a revenue-cost model . . . to provide a service until

a municipality doesn't need it any more, then move onto the next
municipality .... 'The whole [point of the] equation is to spread out your
revenues."')
103

Spielman, supra note 4 ("The ruling . . . clears the way for a major

expansion that will install cameras at more than 330 accident-prone Chicago
intersections by 2012."). Additionally, proposals have been presented to
Chicago's City Council that claim "Chicago could rake in 'at least $200 million'
a year-and wipe out the entire projected deficit for 2009-by using its vast
network of redlight and surveillance cameras to hunt down uninsured
motorists."
Fran Spielman, Uninsured Drivers Might Be Focus of City
Cameras, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at 7, available at NewsBank, Record
No.200903170010.

